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1. Introduction  
 
Different parts of the world engage with each other through trade and payments and through 
cross-border capital flows. The first of these lies within the domain of trade and is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Cross-border capital flows go mostly between Europe and the other OECD countries whose 
financial systems are steadily being integrated (Borio and Disyatat 2011; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
2008; Truman 2009; Shin 2009), not only in the sense of rising volumes of cross-border assets 
and liabilities, but also in rising cross-border ownership and operation of banking and financial 
institutions. However, in the past few decades there has been an increase in Private Non-
Guaranteed external debt (PNG)1 in developing countries and emerging economies, reflecting the 
increasing cross-border flows of capital as well.  
In the past, the growth of cross-border liabilities was associated with borrowing to finance 
trade deficits. That is, the traditional literature on current account balances, which focuses on net 
capital flows, associates external debt in emerging and developing countries with deficits in 
current accounts, and cross-border capital flows with global current account imbalances. 
However, in a world of huge and free capital flows, the external debt in emerging and developing 
countries is no longer directly associated with deficits in their current accounts.  
Following a phenomenon interchangeably called financial integration or financial 
globalisation, where there is an increasing integration of different domestic financial markets 
within international financial markets, resulting in greater mobility of financial assets, developing 
countries countries, since the turn of the century, have experienced a surge in private capital 
flows, which, together with the current account surpluses, have their mirror image in the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. As a result, cross-border asset positions in these 
developing countries have correspondingly increased, with the share of portfolio liabilities 
increasing and that of non-portfolio debt liabilities decreasing. This indicates that the current 
account position only partially explains the patterns of indebtedness of developing countries, and 
that the growing integration into the global financial system increases their exposure to portfolio 
investment that may raise different types of financial stability concerns and expose their 
economies to different factors driving these capital flows. 
This paper argues that the increasing involvement of the private sector in developing 
countries’ external debt and the fact that the public sector, previously reliant almost entirely on 
official credit, has become able to access private debt markets, reflects the increasing integration 
of developing countries into the global financial system. The discussion also highlights the 
connection between the capital flows towards these economies and factors such as the 
international monetary cycle. Further, a closer look at the gross capital flows data reveals that net 
capital flows neither explain nor capture this global financial integration. Finally, the paper 
stresses that an analysis by regions masks the large volume of capital and PNG debt flows which 
mostly concern only a few countries in these developing regions.  
 
 
                                                
1 PNG debts are external obligations of private debtors that are not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. 
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2. Can global imbalances in current accounts explain a country’s cross-border 
financing activity? 
 
The traditional literature on current account balances, which focuses on net capital flows, 
associates external debt in emerging and developing countries with deficits in current accounts, 
and cross-border capital flows with global current account imbalances.  
The current account balance provides the link between foreign debt sustainability and 
economic development. According to standard neoclassical models, international borrowing by 
developing countries should be regarded positively for two main reasons. Firstly, developing 
countries can finance development with foreign savings. By definition, these countries have 
lower capital stocks and lower saving rates, resulting in higher real interest rates and lower 
investment. Importing capital from richer countries allows lucrative investment opportunities to 
be financed at lower interest rates and provides a mutually beneficial arrangement; and a 
“country’s resources for external debt servicing each period can be measured by its trade surplus” 
(Cooper & Sachs, 1984, p. 5). From a long-term perspective, the solvency requirement implies 
that the discounted value of future trade surpluses must be equal to the current foreign debt. A 
socially optimal borrowing strategy is to borrow until the marginal product of capital is equal to 
the world interest rate. 
The second benefit of international borrowing comes from the intertemporal approach to the 
current account, which sees the balance of payments as determined by forward-looking 
investment and saving decisions (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1994). Intertemporal utility out of 
consumption maximisation gives a result similar to the permanent income theory of consumption: 
consumption is a stable function of permanent national cash-flow, defined as the discounted sum 
of future total output minus investment and government expenditure (Ghosh & Ostry, 1995; 
Sachs, 1982). Current accounts are therefore used as a buffer against temporary shocks in 
national cash flows. Within this framework a temporary negative shock in national output will 
not affect the country’s permanent cash flow, thus leaving current consumption unchanged. As a 
result, the country borrows to smooth consumption, due, for example, to a permanent 
productivity shock, thus running a current account deficit.  
In either case, the current account imbalances and the resulting accumulation of foreign debt 
need not be a cause of concern, as developing countries only borrow from abroad to either 
finance investment by exploiting the lower cost of foreign capital or to try to smooth 
consumption in anticipation of higher future incomes. The corresponding policy view, known as 
the Lawson doctrine,2 maintained that, so long as current account deficits originated in the private 
sector, the resulting liabilities were hedged in the private sector and therefore are not a cause for 
policy intervention. 
Empirically, however, the balance of payment and currency crises that hit emerging and 
developing countries in the early 1980s and then again in the late 1990s challenged this 
consensus. Authors began to question the relevance of the intertemporal approach to the current 
account and the associated Lawson doctrine, and consequently current account deficits came 
under closer scrutiny.3 A historical evidence of current account deficits and their association with 
crisis were shown through the works of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Edwards (2001), for 
                                                
2 From the name of Nigel Lawson, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer in the1980s, who first expressed this view. 
3 For more details see Reisen (1998). 
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instance. Current accounts were deemed sustainable if they were consistent with the solvency 
requirement, i.e. if they implied a long-run stable ratio of external liabilities to GDP (Edwards, 
2001; Milesi-Ferretti & Razin, 1998; Reisen, 1998). Further, the existence of deficits and their 
reversal as a result of a sudden stop in net capital flows were theorised as the canonical crisis 
mechanics (Calvo, 1998). 
The discussion on current account deficits, or lack thereof, remained a central research topic 
in the 2000s. The “capital flow puzzle” literature, for example, highlights the fact that in net 
terms capital flows uphill from developing countries to advanced countries (Gourinchas & 
Jeanne, 2007; Kose, Prasad & Terrones, 2003a; Prasad, Rajan & Subramanian, 2007). Obstfeld 
(2012a) argues for a policy of monitoring current accounts, as credit booms show a relationship 
between current account imbalances and financial crises. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003b) 
document that financial openness, which was supposed to allow countries to fully exploit the 
consumption-smoothing function of current accounts, seems to be positively associated with 
higher consumption volatility, especially in lower-income countries. Blanchard and Milesi-
Ferretti (2009) closely relate the development of global current account imbalances to the build-
up and evolution of the global financial crisis, and suggest that their further reduction is a 
necessary condition of the post-crisis economic recovery.  
While sometimes maintaining opposite opinions on the importance of current accounts for 
financial and economic stability, the standard critiques of neoclassical models of international 
borrowing by developing countries summarised above seem to share a common belief: the 
current account is the key driver of changes in foreign debt and foreign liabilities in general. The 
focus therefore should be on net external liabilities, just as the current account focuses on net 
capital flows. This view has, however, been challenged by both empirical evidence and 
theoretical arguments linked to the trends of financial globalisation. 
The path-breaking work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and subsequent related works 
(Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2003, 2007, 2008) document that the expansion of cross-border asset 
holdings since 1996, and in the 1990s in particular, has been unprecedented and, while it 
occurred mostly between advanced countries, emerging and developing economies have also 
experienced an increasing degree of financial integration. This trend has given rise to a series of 
empirical regularities. Firstly, in general, gross cross-border holdings and financial flows are 
several orders of magnitude bigger than their corresponding net figures (Brunnermeier et al., 
2012; Obstfeld, 2012b). Secondly, the accumulation of foreign assets has increased the 
importance of capital gains and losses on international investment positions (Lane & Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007).4 Thirdly, emerging and developing countries have accumulated more diversified 
liabilities – with more private debt and equity-like liabilities as opposed to the past concentration 
on public debt liabilities – as well as accumulating external assets, primarily in the form of 
foreign exchange reserves by central banks. Overall, their net foreign asset position seems to 
have improved in the decade preceding the global financial crisis (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). 
Alongside these empirical observations, ‘new’ theoretical arguments have been proposed in 
favour of focusing on gross rather than net flows and positions (Borio & Disyatat, 2011; Broner, 
Didier, Erce & Schmukler, 2011; Bruno & Shin, 2013; Johnson, 2009). Borio and Disyatat 
                                                
4 Such ‘valuation effects’ have been the subject of a vast literature seeking to analyse their role as an alternative 
balance of payment adjustment mechanism. See, for example, Cavallo & Tille (2006), Devereux & Sutherland  
(2010), Gourinchas & Rey (2005). 
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(2011) argue that current accounts, by definition, only measure the transactions that relate to 
trade in goods and services and income transfers, while all other asset transactions are excluded. 
In their view, this arises out of confusion between savings – unspent income – and financing – a 
cash flow concept. Investment, like most economic activities, does not require savings but rather 
financing, which can be found domestically or internationally. In the latter case, it generates a 
cross-border money flow as a result of which an institution in the lending country will have a 
claim (a loan asset) on the borrower and the borrower will have a claim on the lender (a bank 
account credit, which can be transferred to other agents). As a result, current accounts are not 
necessarily tied to any specific gross flows or specific domestic activities. The analysis of 
international financial relations focusing on the current account is, therefore, unjustified.  
Saving-investment balances, current accounts and net capital flows analysis reflect only a 
small part of the global financial flows. Very often, gross flow needs bear no relationship to the 
net flows in the current account balance and are generally much larger than the latter, reflecting 
in part the myriad of ways in which expenditures are ultimately financed. In this sense, based on 
the inter-temporal equilibrium approach to current account as formalised in the 1990s by Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995), the current account framework analysis of the origin and direction of 
financing, with surplus countries lending to deficit ones, relies on identities that track resource 
flows, but are silent about their underlying financing (Borio & Disyatat, 2015, pp. 4–5). 
Furthermore, the current account balance of payment framework places the foreign exchange 
reserves as a subcomponent of gross outflows and current account surplus is frequently tied to 
accumulation of foreign reserves. However, in general, this is an arbitrary match, as gross flows 
typically exceed net flows and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is generally a 
purely financial transaction. The accumulation of foreign reserves is the result of countless 
domestic players acquiring foreign assets at any given point in time for different reasons5 and, 
empirically, countries running current account deficits do accumulate large amount of foreign 
reserves (Borio & Disyatart, 2011, pp. 9-12). Therefore, it is wrong to assume that it is 
‘necessary’ to have a current account surplus for reserves accumulation or a current account 
deficit to finance investment internationally.  
Finally, Borio and Disyatart (2011, 2015) note that when assessing capital flows, and more 
specifically global financing patterns, it may be necessary to move away from the residency 
principle, which underlies the balance-of-payments statistics, to a perspective that consolidates 
operations of individual firms across borders. 
These arguments inspired new theoretical and empirical research into the dynamics and 
consequences of gross capital flows. For example, both gross inflows and outflows typically 
move pro-cyclically, and crises tend to involve sharp reductions in both (Broner et al., 2011). 
Sudden stops of gross flows, whether or not resulting in net sudden stops, may be very damaging 
to the economy (Cavallo, Powell, Pedemonte & Tavella, 2013). Financial vulnerabilities are 
largely related to gross capital flows and the salient trends in international banking activity, 
which, in turn, is largely unrelated to – or, at the least, not captured by – global current account 
imbalances (Borio & Disyatat, 2011). 
 
                                                
5 The empirical evidence shows that the accumulation of foreign reserves is undeniable and unprecedented in 
emerging markets. Nevertheless, the debate over the reasons and drivers behind this accumulation is still 
controversial and can be variously explained. See Bussière & Mulder, 1999; Nowak, Hviding, & Ricci, 2004; 
Painceira, 2009; Reinhart & Reinhart, 2008; Rodrik, 2006. 
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The analytical emphasis on gross flows and cross-border holdings, along with the stylised 
facts of financial globalisation, suggest a different line of inquiry into developing and emerging 
countries’ external financing needs. Alongside traditional indicators, such as current accounts and 
trade balances, the evolution of developing and emerging countries’ external debts should be 
analysed in relation to their integration in the global financial system and changes in the maturity 
structure of that debt, reflecting refinancing and hedging requirements independent of any current 
trade imbalance. Consequently, any assessment of the vulnerability of such external positions 
must take into account the characteristics of such integration, which may raise issues other than 
the common balance of payments vulnerabilities.  
 
 
3. External debt – developing countries overall picture 
 
3.1 Trends in external debt 
 
The data below show the external debt stocks of developing countries growing steadily since 
the 1970s. After the year 2000, the rate of growth increases and debt is accumulated at a much 
faster rate and is largely long term6 (Figure 1). One important feature of this growth is the sharp 
increase in the external debt stock of Private Non-Guaranteed debt (PNG) after 2002 (Figure 2). 
This reveals an interesting trend. While, during the 1970s and 1980s, external debt accumulation 
was mainly through the public sector, in the early 1990s the private sector gradually began to 
borrow, and since the mid-2000s, at a rapid pace. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Long term private and public debt has an original or extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed 
to non-residents by residents of an economy and repayable in currency, goods, or services. (IDS, 2019) 
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Figure 1: External Debt by Maturity  
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
 
 
Figure 2: Share of the Total External Debt 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
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This tendency is confirmed when exploring the different regional dynamics (Figure 3).7 
Historically, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) used to have the largest external debt 
stocks. Nevertheless, this has been rivalled in the past decade by the rise in external debt in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP). Sharp increases in 
external debt stocks are also noted for South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions 
from 2006 onwards. 
Contrary to what might have been expected, the external debt accumulation in all regions has 
continued apace post-2008, with the three largest debtor regions presenting external debts in 
excess of US$1 trillion. The different regional dynamics can also be explored when considering, 
in absolute terms, the maturity of external debt. All regions but EAP present a majority of long-
term external debt. LAC, ECA and EAP have the largest long-term external debt stocks, all of 
which have grown rapidly within the last decade. SA and SSA have also seen fast accumulation 
of long-term debt since 2006, albeit their totals are significantly lower. The Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region’s long-term external debt has remained roughly constant (Figure 
A1 in appendix). 
SA, SSA and MENA have a very small stock of short-term debt, which, especially in the 
cases of SSA and MENA, may be explained by the fact that historically the main component of 
the external debt has been official bilateral and multilateral debt. LAC, ECA and EAP have been 
accumulating short-term debt at a faster pace since 2007, in particular the EAP region whose fast 
pace began after 2000 and has become even faster since 2008 (Figure A2 in appendix). The EAP 
particular case may be related to international investors looking to place their money elsewhere in 
the midst of the global financial crisis. However, as the increase has been sustained since 1990, 
despite the steep drop during the crisis in 1997/8, it is reasonable to assume that the short-term 
debts are associated with trade credits as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 LAC: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. 
lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, RB, American and Caribbean. ECA: Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kygyz Republic, 
Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. EAP: Cambodia, China, Fiji,  Indonesia, Lao PDR,  Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines,  Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga,  Vanuatu, Vietnam. SA: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldive, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. SSA: Angola Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, The Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudanc, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
 
 9 
Figure 3: Total External Debt Stock by Region 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
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Figure 4 depicts a summary of these main tendencies in each region.8 
 
Figure 4: External Debt Composition by Region 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
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Surprisingly, debt indicators such as the interest payment on external debt as a percentage of 
export of goods, services and primary income, and interest payment on external debt as a 
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Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (IMF, 2018), which have played their part in 
improving debt servicing capabilities of developing countries. It should be noted, however, this is 
                                                
8 For a detailed analysis of the external debt components in each region since the 1970s, including official 
multilateral and bilateral creditors, see Bonizzi, Laskaridis and Toporowski (2015a), pp. 11–26. 
9 There are no internationally accepted benchmarks for assessing debt sustainability; over time different 
methodologies for criteria and thresholds have been used such as the enhanced Highly-Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative or the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). Although the criteria of the internal financial 
institutions (IFIs) are not without problems, this paper utilises the benchmarks of the HIPC initiative and DSF to 
compare debt indicators across regions. 
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more noticeable on an aggregate level. 
 
Figure 5: Selected Debt Service Indicators - All Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 When considering debt indicators to assess the liquidity of borrowers under the HIPC 
initiative and Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), the total debt service to export, service and 
primary income ratio, defined by HIPC as being sustainable at 15-20%, has been below 20% 
since 2006 for all regions except for ECA (Figure A3). The DSF states that debt service on 
external debt, that is, the ability of the government to repay external debt from domestic 
resources (the budget service ratio), should not be more than 25% of the domestic budget revenue 
and, since 2007, this has shown a downwards tendency for all regions except Emerging and 
Developing Europe10 where the indicator has skyrocketed. On the antipodes, the MENA region 
has, since 2004, been consistently below threshold. Overall, after 2012, only MENA, LAC and 
SSA have managed to stay below the threshold (Figure A4). Therefore, while growth increased, 
payments (as a share of income) decreased, and the traditional methods of sustainability 
assessment paint a positive picture of the situation.  
In sum, it is fair to conclude that under the HIPC and DSF benchmarks, with the exception 
of ECA, the regions have been quite sustainable, especially after 2004.  
 
 
3.3 Concentration of debt 
 
Although the scenario depicted does identify various trends in the external PNG debt of 
developing countries, the diversity cannot be overstated. The ECA and EAP regions, where PNG 
                                                
10 Starting with the April 2014 World Economic Outlook Database, the Central and Eastern Europe and 
Emerging Europe regions were renamed Emerging and Developing Europe. 
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has surpassed the PPG, comprise six out of the ten countries that (out of the 124 countries that 
report to the World Bank’s IDS) together account for 65% of the total developing country 
external debt. ECA, with 22 countries, has Turkey, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. EAP, with 
17 countries, has China and Indonesia. LAC, where the PNG is close to surpassing the PPG, has 
Brazil and Mexico. Furthermore, ECA has five out of the top ten countries11 concentrating large 
sums of PNG in absolute terms. LAC has two, EAP two and SA has one. (Figure 6) 
 
Figure 6: External PNG in US$ billions 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
 
 
This shows that the overall tendency in all developing countries, and in the analysis by 
regions, may be masked by the large volume of debt flows of only a few countries, and is very 
likely to be driven by a handful of these developing countries. Figure 7 shows that the 
accumulation of PNG debt is concentrated in a few destinations when comparing, in absolute 
terms, the total external stock of PNG of all developing countries against the total external stock 
of PNG accumulated in the top ten countries. These ten countries are responsible for the bulk of 
cross-border external private debt.  
Here, it must also be considered that the accumulation of PNG debts is a crucial determinant 
of a country or region's financial stability. A country or region that is more dependent on PNG 
debt indicates that, on one hand, they have access to international financial markets and are an 
investment destination for institutional investors whilst, on the other, based on lessons from the 
past (see Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009), it also indicates the potential instability of these flows 
                                                
11 Brazil, India, China, Turkey, Kazakhistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Ukraine, Romania and South Africa. 
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that have characterised the legacy of financial globalisation. The fluctuations in flows on PNG 
debts are significant and could potentially indicate problems in future financing needs, as these 
changes are frequently unpredictable. In this light, the global cross-border debt in developing 
countries is, in fact, a remarkable concentration of debt and risk in these top ten countries.  
 
 
Figure 7: Total External Debt Stock of PNG versus Total External Stock of PNG in the Top 
Ten Countries  
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
 
 
4. Foreign Trade trends in Developing Countries 
 
Considering the traditional view on the relationship between current accounts and trade 
balances and the evolution of developing and emerging countries’ external debts, it is commonly 
argued that external indebtedness depends, among other things, on current account imbalances. 
Essentially, from a national accounting point of view, current account deficits imply a need for 
foreign resources to finance them.12 In this section, we show that not always current accounts 
trade and trade balances follow a close relationship. Furthermore, we show that developing 
economies in general have experienced recurrent surpluses, despite an overall current account 
balance deterioration since 2008. 
                                                
12 Statistics come from a wide range of sources. Data for current accounts and their components come from 
UNCTAD for the aggregate figures and income groups, and from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for the 
regional statistics. Data from the United Nations Comtrade Database (UN Comtrade) provide a more detailed look at 
the evolution of trade of developing countries, allowing disaggregation across the different components of trade as 
well as trading partners. The Standard International Trade Classification (SITC classification) is used to distinguish 
different types of goods. 
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The overall picture for emerging and developing countries shows the current account and the 
trade account following a very similar pattern, especially in the 2002-2009 period when they 
increased remarkably, peaking in 2007, and then contracted in 2008. However, after 2009 the two 
series seem to decouple, with the trade balance remaining stable in absolute terms and slightly 
declining as a percentage of GDP, whereas the current account deteriorated sharply both in 
absolute and relative terms, becoming negative in 2013 (Figures A5 an A6). The declining 
income balance matches our findings in the previous sections, with debt service amounts owed by 
developing countries increasing steeply during the same time period.  
Overall, Figures A5 and A6 show the emerging and developing countries had a current 
account surplus in 2000-2013, but the vast balance of payments surpluses have deteriorated since 
2007 due to the financial crisis. It is also clear that the position of emerging and developing 
economies seems to be heavily dependent on the global business cycle, which mostly influences 
their current accounts through changes in trade.  
The trade breakdown into commodities shows that, on one hand, manufacturing is the most 
important part of emerging and developing countries’ exports and imports, accounting for 
roughly twice the value of commodities trade over the whole period. On the other hand, while 
trade in manufacturing presents a roughly balanced account, the overall trade surplus has mostly 
been driven by a surplus in commodities trade (Figures A7 and A8). A puzzling finding since 
2013 is the fact that, the commodity trade balance dropped sharply and the manufacturing surplus 
increased equally sharply, leaving the trade balance almost unchanged. The data show how this is 
the result of a decline in commodity exports and manufacturing imports, while manufacturing 
exports continued to increase.  
Net factor income is negative for all regions (except temporarily in the MENA region in a 
few periods), with values around 3% for LA, ASEAN and SSA countries. This is noteworthy 
since it shows that dividends and interest payments paid to foreign investors and official lenders 
are a very important component of these countries’ financial position, and are not balanced by 
emigrant workers’ remittances. The global financial crisis, unlike the trade figures, does not seem 
to have had a clear effect on income flows (Figure A9). Current transfers are unsurprisingly 
positive for all regions, except the MENA countries. This latter finding most likely reflects the 
inclusion of richer oil-exporting countries in the group, such as the Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, 
which are not targets of aid and official assistance flows (Figure A10). 
In sum, the evolution of emerging and developing countries’ current accounts, which quite 
closely follow that of the trade in goods accounts, presented positive figures until 2008, with the 
exception of SA, whose services trade surplus did not compensate for the growing trade in goods 
deficits. Most countries experienced positive or balanced current accounts, which were primarily 
driven by the positive evolution of their (goods) trade accounts. This again confirms that 
emerging and developing economies seems to be very dependent on the global business cycle 
influencing their current account through changes in trade.  
Despite all the regions having suffered as a result of the 2008 crisis, the deterioration of trade 
and current accounts since then has been slow but steady. Although since 2007-8, LA, SSA and 
SA have not presented surpluses in their current accounts, overall, the figures also show that most 
regions have also not been especially vulnerable externally in terms of their overall current 
account balances. That is, the analysis of current accounts suggests that the developing world, 
from the period starting roughly at the turn of the century until the global financial crisis, 
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experienced a decade of relatively low ‘traditional’ external vulnerability. Finally, the net factor 
income and current transfers essentially confirm a structural condition of emerging and 
developing countries: they are net interest and dividend payers to foreign countries, and net 
receivers of foreign transfers.  
One final important point to highlight is that all regions except SA are net commodity 
exporters, with commodities constituting a growing majority of their exports. Although a more 
detailed study is necessary to examine the proportion of commodity exports to the total exports, 
there seems to be a correlation between the share of commodity exports and the trade balance 
(IDS, 2017). As a consequence, the deterioration of the trade balance caused by the deterioration 
of commodity trade since 2007-8, which resulted in current account deficits in five of the six 
regions, can be explained at least partly by the cycle in commodity prices. As shown in Figure 
A11, commodity prices which had been low or falling in the 2004-2008 period recovered in 
2009-2012, but have been declining since then. The recent deterioration in current accounts is 
therefore at least partially imputable to a decline in commodity prices.  
 
5. International financial integration, current account and external indebtedness 
 
Financial integration of developing countries may not be immediately obvious through the 
examination of current account balances. There are other tendencies that should be examined, 
which can be grouped under a discussion of financial globalisation. The discussion in this section 
and the next one will essentially be putting forward the argument that the idea of financial 
globalisation is in fact at odds with the traditional literature on international borrowing. 
The previous discussion shows that since 2006 not only has the total external debt stock 
increased in emerging and developing countries, but the importance of private sector external 
debt has grown. It has also been showed that outside of the OECD, current accounts are mostly 
driven by trade in goods, except in SA. Thus, the deterioration of commodity trade due to the 
2007-8 financial crisis affected the trade balance, which in turn, had a negative effect on the 
current account. This deterioration is closely related to the commodity price cycle, which was 
low or falling in the 2004-2008 period, recovered in 2009-2012, and has been declining since 
then. This clearly raises possible new concerns about the balance of payments fragility of these 
countries, with commodity dependence being therefore a crucial concern for debt sustainability in 
emerging and developing countries.  
However, despite the deterioration of the trade balances since 2007-8 and, therefore, current 
account deficits for the majority of the regions in the same period, the accumulation of external 
debt for all emerging developing countries has not directly followed the movements in the current 
accounts. The total external debt stocks in billions of US dollars increased for all regions since 
the beginning of the 2000s, with a sharp increase since 2007-8. More precisely, the accumulation 
of PNG has been increasing since the beginning of the 2000s, again with a sharp increase since 
2007-8. In this light, as argued by Borio et al. (2011) for the case of the advanced economies, 
current account positions only partially explain the patterns of external indebtedness of emerging 
and developing countries too. 
It is also important to emphasise that, surprisingly, although debt service has increased since 
the beginning of the 2000s, especially for PNG, debt indicators such as interest payments on 
external debt as a percentage of export of goods, services and primary income, and interest 
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payments on external debt as a percentage of GNI, have, on aggregate levels, improved since the 
beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, when considering debt indicators to assess the liquidity and 
solvency of the borrowers under the HIPC and DSF frameworks, it is fair to conclude that, apart 
from ECA, debt in these regions appears to have been quite sustainable, especially after 2004. 
Thus, the combination of the evidence presented in the previous sections suggests that the 
characteristics of external debt accumulation in developing countries may not be made 
immediately coherent by the examination of the balance of payment positions. Not only have 
most countries experienced positive or balanced current accounts while experiencing an increase 
in the accumulation of external debt, but as noted above, the debt indicator to assess liquidity and 
solvency of borrowers also suggest that in the period starting roughly at the turn of the century 
until the global financial crisis, these emerging and developing countries have experienced a 
decade of relatively low ‘traditional’ external vulnerability.  
An approach to the increase of private financial flows from a different angle, however, 
indicates that the ability of the private sectors in developing countries to borrow abroad has 
increased substantially and the proportion of external liabilities taken up by securitised debts has 
also increased. In this sense, as documented by Akyüz (2012), in many emerging economies 
foreign investors have become primary holders of capital and debt securities as a result of the 
increasing portfolio flows targeting equities and local currency debt. This is also a result of the 
rise in corporations in emerging countries borrowing externally.  
Clear evidence of such increase in participation by foreign financial investors can be seen in 
the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) database, which collects data from mutual funds 
and shows how foreign investors’ holdings of emerging markets equities and bonds have 
increased rapidly over the past decade (Figure 8). This confirms the findings shown in Figure 2 
which indicates a growing composition of external debt made up of private sector and public 
sector bonds. Equity holdings started increasing around 2004 but since 2009 bonds holdings have 
been catching up very quickly, especially after 2008 (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8: EPRF Bond Allocation in USD millions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: EPFR Equity Allocation in USD millions 
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These figures show an increasing involvement of the private sector in the developing 
countries’ external debt, with the public sector, previously reliant almost entirely on official 
credit, becoming able to access private debt markets. This trend is the product of the integration 
of many developing countries into the global financial system which followed the writing down 
or refinancing of public external debt in those countries through support from the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative.  
More recently, international financial investors, subject to the low-interest rate environment 
in Japan, North America and Europe, have been attracted by the apparently substantially 
improved fundamentals of many developing countries, in a “search for yield” for their portfolio 
investments.13 Thus, overall, the recent changes in the composition of the developing countries’ 
external debt indicate an increasing involvement of private sector institutions, both as borrowers 
and lenders. This leads us to consider the role that interest rates play in this scenario, as interest 
rates on private external debt are determined in global markets, and frequently there is a 
considerable gap between the international interest rate and the (domestic) developing countries 
rates.  
 
 
5.1 Financial globalisation and the international monetary cycle 
  
The capability of developing countries to incur in private and public sector external 
indebtedness as well as their potential for refinancing the debt along the yield curve do not rest 
only on their domestic macroeconomic policies. The growing participation of these emerging and 
developing countries in the global financial market increases the susceptibility of these countries 
to the international monetary cycle that determines the liquidity of international capital markets. 
This cycle is driven by the monetary policy of central banks in countries that are international 
financial centres or intermediaries, principally the USA, but also United Kingdom, Switzerland 
and the European Monetary Union and, to some extent also Tokyo and Singapore.  
The monetary cycle determines the liquidity of capital markets in these financial centres in 
two ways. Changes in central bank interest rates alter the composition of financing in these 
centres because the relative cost of different types of financing is changed; also, open market 
operations, such as the recent quantitative easing, which is the exchange central banks’ reserves 
for long-term securities, make markets for those securities more liquid.  
There is considerable evidence of a major shift in perceptions of risk in international capital 
markets driven by expected changes in US monetary policy (Rey, 2013; Shin, 2012). Whenever 
US monetary policy becomes highly expansionary, with low interest rates and ample provision of 
liquidity, investors and lenders become more risk-seeking, reducing global risk-premia and 
spreads. Conversely, any prospect of monetary tightening tends to increase risk-premia, as 
investors become more risk-averse and invest in safer assets. With their emerging integration into 
                                                
13 It is important to note as well that official development policy has itself become more supportive of the 
private sector. As documented in Bonizzi et al. (2015b), there has been a shift in the official development policy 
consensus towards the promotion of the private sector. Indeed, a substantial part of official flows from advanced 
countries goes to support private sector initiatives, including the financial sector, rather than humanitarian purposes. 
Furthermore, official flows themselves are increasingly being augmented with private funds through the process of 
‘blending’, whereby private financial institutions complement the official aid budgets with guarantees being 
provided by the borrowers and/or the donors. This policy consensus helps explain the expansion of the private sector 
in some of these regions, for example, SSA. 
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global financial markets, the emerging and developing countries’ bond yields may be affected by 
these processes. 
Another frequently used indicator of investors’ confidence is the Volatility-Index (VIX), 
which measures the implied volatility that investors expect from the S&P 500 Index (Figure 
A12). Higher levels imply high-expected volatility and therefore low investors’ risk appetite. 
Spikes in the VIX can be seen in May 2010, August 2011 and August 2015, all notoriously 
turbulent periods for financial markets. Comparing this with Figures 8 and 9, bond flows and 
allocation, it can clearly be seen that during these periods inflows were much lower (May 2010) 
or negative (August, 2011).  
The integration of the emerging and developing economies from the perspective of 
increasing cross-border assets and liabilities and, consequently, the increasing presence of private 
international investors should encourage their governments and multilateral agencies to look 
beyond the traditional forms of integration and instability and fluctuation crisis-mechanisms. The 
international monetary cycle is one aspect of it, which involves not only US monetary policy, 
including among other things strengthening of the US dollar, so-called quantitative easing and so 
on, but also the Bank of England and the European Central Bank monetary policies, for example.  
Further, interest rates on private external debt are determined in global markets, which 
clearly applies to bond markets in general. This indicates that private debt is more directly 
exposed to fluctuations in global market changes, so attention has to be given to debts that float 
with market rates such as the LIBOR, for example. Capital controls also affect the direction of 
flows in the international capital market, both when they seek to exclude such flows, and when 
such flows are allowed.14 
In sum, financial integration and the increased presence of private investors and private 
capital in emerging and developing countries make the latter’s financing conditions more closely 
dependent on global financial market trends. This in turn reveals two interesting aspects. First, it 
confirms the limitations of the current account framework in explaining capital inflows and 
outflows to these countries. Second, while the access of these countries to more diverse sources 
of credit can be potentially positive for external debt sustainability, it also adds the vulnerability 
of global financial factors to the traditional balance of payment concern. Therefore, the 
integration of these markets into the global financial system needs careful scrutiny to ensure that 
it does not create more instability than benefits.  
 
 
6. Further analysis of financial globalisation 
 
In light of the previous discussion, it is relevant to question the traditional literature on 
international borrowing and to highlight a few aspects that underline the current financial 
integration of developing countries, such as the accumulation of foreign reserves. To this aim, 
Figure 10 below looks at current account balances, private financial flows (net), official flows 
(net), and changes in foreign reserves. Unsurprisingly, it can be seen that since the turn of the 
century there has been a substantial increase in net private inflows to emerging and developing 
economies – from around 100 to over 500 USD billions between 2002 and 2007. In line with the 
                                                
14 An analysis of the capital flows among emerging and developing economies considering some of these 
aspects is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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findings of the previous sections, this was accompanied by surpluses in the current accounts, 
which resulted in the explosion of reserves accumulation, which increased more than ten-fold in 
the same period. While the global financial crisis has absorbed some of these increases, the levels 
of these positions remain much higher than in 2006.  
Because of the domestic arrangements underpinning the financial integration in emerging 
economies and the debate over the unholy trinity and the constraint issue, (Eichengreen & 
Hausmann, 1999, 2005; Eichengreen, Hausmann, & Panizza, 2002), the need to accumulate 
foreign reserves has been adopted by these economies as a policy of self-insurance since the 
financial crises of the 1990s (Datz, 2008, p. 84; Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 14; Painceira, 2009, p. 12).15 
Put simply, in the absence of structural change of global finance since the crises of the late 1990s, 
foreign reserves were used as a defence against sudden reversals of capital flows (Painceira, 
2009, p. 12), particularly after short-term borrowing began to rise again (Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 14). 
Interestingly, the mainstream economic literature makes a similar argument. It is argued that 
the financial crises in the late 1990s, marked by sudden reversals of capital flows, resulted in the 
emerging economies using global liquidity as an opportunity to increase their foreign exchange 
reserves in order to cope with exchange rate depreciation due to capital flights; this accumulation 
gave them more flexibility and control over their monetary policies (Reinhart & Reinhart, 2008, 
p. 22).16 
Although the causes of foreign exchange reserves accumulation can be variously explained, 
it nevertheless signals, along with the high net private capital inflows, the growing presence of 
emerging and developing countries in the global financial system. Thus, emerging markets have 
been major recipients of private financial flows albeit most of these flows have been ‘recycled’ 
back by the central banks to advanced countries in the form of foreign exchange reserves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 Although the accumulation of foreign reserves has also been associated with regular current account 
surpluses in emerging economies, empirical evidence shows that the self-insurance policy has been applied by 
countries with no current account surpluses, but with significant short-term capital flows, notably in Africa (Alves, 
Boufounou, Dellis, Pitelis, & Toporowski, 2016). The IMF and the World Bank have also enforced this policy 
independently of any current account surpluses (IMF, 2008, p. 37). 
16 The mainstream debate has also focused on ascertaining the optimal level of international reserves (Bussière 
& Mulder, 1999; Nowak, Hviding, & Ricci, 2004) and the measurement of the social cost of reserve accumulation 
(Rodrik, 2006). 
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Figure 10: Emerging and Developing Economies (USD billions) 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook database (several years) 
 
 
Figure A13 shows that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves resulted, as expected, 
in an increasing share of reserves to total external assets. The A13 figure furthermore shows how 
the share of portfolio liabilities to total liabilities and that of debt (portfolio and other) liabilities 
have moved in almost symmetrically opposite directions over the whole 1990-2010 period. The 
increase in the portfolio liabilities share is especially remarkable since FDI also increased 
substantially in the same period. The financial crisis since 2008 has tended to reduce the pace of 
these trends, but it has not reversed them. This trend is closely linked to the rapid and sustained 
increase in PNG debts analysed before and seems to indicate an increasing importance of capital 
and bond markets in the dynamics of emerging and developing external liabilities. 
It is important to note, however, that, in several periods, reserve accumulation actually 
exceeded the current account surplus. Taking as an example the Emerging Asia countries,17 
Figure A14, borrowed from Borio & Disyatat (2011), illustrates the gross capital flows against 
current account balance and changes in reserves, and confirms that the common approach of 
linking current account surplus to the accumulation of official reserves should be taken carefully, 
especially considering that gross flows typically considerably exceed net flows. 
This again confirms, as argued by Borio and Disyatat (2011), the inadequacy of the common 
assumption that gross flows are determined by net flows and, by extension, the treatment of the 
current account balance as the main determinant of gross flows. The question that then remains is 
to what extent the changes in foreign exchange reserves, by construction a sub-component of 
gross outflows, reflect official-sector holdings of foreign-currency liquid assets, and how those 
reserves are related to gross capital inflows into emerging and developing countries. Given the 
increase of the PNG in a few developing countries since 2006, this question may lead to a 
definition of foreign assets that is broader than the definition of foreign reserves. 
 
                                                
17 Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. 
 
 
 22 
6.1 Gross and net capital flows and the centralisation of external private debt 
 
The evidence for financial globalisation can also be seen in Figures A15 and A16 which 
show the data on cross-border holdings with external assets and liabilities growing continuously 
since 1970 (and particularly quickly in the 2000s), both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
GDP. Another notable feature is the progressively narrowing gap between asset and liabilities 
over the same period, indicating improving net foreign asset positions, as documented by Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
The significant growth of assets and liabilities not only confirms the idea of financial 
globalisation, but indicates that current accounts, i.e. net flows, do not play a dominant role in 
determining gross capital flows, and the definition of foreign reserves as constructed in the 
national account may not cover all the bulk of gross inflows that originate in the private sector.  
Although beyond the scope of this paper, an important line of inquire in this context is to 
understand the driving forces behind these cross-border flows, and, by extension, the drivers 
behind the increase in the external debt of the private sector in these developing countries in the 
last few decades. The current account position not only fails to explain the cross-border capital 
flows, but it also overstates a trend (concentration of cross-border debt) that is typical of only a 
few countries. Participation in financial globalisation is specific to a few countries in these 
developing regions, and their respective gross capital inflow and outflow. In order to investigate 
these driver, analyses of this process should break away from an examination based on regions or 
income groups and focus on these countries (see Bonizzi, 2015). 
It is also clear that an analysis of gross capital flows and current accounts, and of gross 
capital inflows by categories (for example, official, direct investment and government securities), 
as done by Borio and Disyatat (2011) for the US, is long overdue in these ten countries that 
together compromise 65% of the total of developing countries’ private external debt. It seems 
extremely important when assessing global financing to move away from the issues of trade 
balances to an approach that looks at operations of individual firms across borders, which 
sometimes are largely unrelated or not captured by current account imbalances.  
For example, during the period before the 2007-8 crisis, some of the largest exporters in 
Brazil, making use of extremely high domestic interest rates and considerable international 
liquidity, engaged in arbitrage operations using their external resources as the base for 
transactions in the derivative market. The crisis and as a consequence the devaluation of the Real 
caused large capital losses to these exporters, which in several cases threatened their solvency 
(see Barbosa & de Souza, 2010, p. 24). The government had no choice but to intervene 
offering/facilitating them credit, especially because these firms were major players determining 
the Brazilian balance of payments. Despite the clear solvency threat, the cross border flows 
between these exporters and non-residents have not been clearly documented, especially by the 
national account statistics.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
External debt accumulation among developing countries increasingly occur in the private 
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sector, starting in the early 1990s and accelerating after the mid-2000s, while the share of 
liabilities held by government and multilateral institutions decreased. The significant increase in 
the developing countries’ private external debts and, therefore, the surge in private capital flows, 
happened mainly within a context of current account surpluses. The surpluses in the current 
accounts partially explain the explosion of the foreign reserves accumulation that happened at the 
same time in developing and emerging economies. The explanation is only partial due to the fact 
that not only did this accumulation, in several periods, exceed the current account surpluses, but 
it also carried on, though at a slower pace, even when these regions started showing a 
deterioration in trade balances from 2007-8 onwards.  
The deterioration of the trade balances followed by current account deficits for the majority 
of the regions since 2007-8 might have reinforced the tendency towards the increase in external 
private sector indebtedness that started in early 1990. Further, the deterioration was closely 
related to the commodity price cycle, which clearly raises possible new concerns about the 
balance of payments fragility of these countries, with commodity dependence being a crucial 
concern for debt sustainability in a traditional sense in emerging and developing countries. 
However, the increasing involvement of the private sector in developing countries’ external 
debt means the increasing integration of these countries into the global financial system, and this 
integration is no longer limited to trade in goods and services, and income transfers. Financial 
transactions vastly outpaced trade-related transactions, as the trend of financial globalisation 
involves a bulk of other asset transactions that originate in the private sector and are excluded 
from the traditional current account framework.  
This becomes clearer when examining some of the features of the financial globalisation that 
began in the 1990s in developing and emerging countries when foreign investors have become 
primary holders of capital and debt securities as a result of both the increasing portfolio flows 
targeting equities and local currency debt and the rise in emerging countries’ corporations 
borrowing externally. Foreign investors are now holders of both emerging markets’ equities and 
bonds: these two securities have increased rapidly since 2006, which shows a progressively 
narrowing gap between asset and liabilities. These recent changes in the composition of the 
developing countries’ external debt indicate an increasing involvement of private sector 
institutions as both borrowers and lenders.  
Further, the growth of external assets and liabilities raises questions about the common 
approach linking the current account surplus to the accumulation of official reserves. Reserve 
accumulation broadly indicates, along with the high net private capital inflows, the growing 
presence of emerging and developing countries in the global financial system. Nevertheless, the 
traditional current account framework does not explain or justify the drivers behind cross-border 
capital flows, as the volume of gross capital flows dwarfs that of net (current account) flows. 
Moreover, the accumulation shows that emerging markets have not only been major recipients of 
private financial flows, but most of these flows have been returned to developed countries in the 
form of foreign exchange reserves. 
The growing participation of emerging and developing countries in the global financial 
market also means that they are exposed to the international monetary cycle that determines the 
liquidity conditions in those markets. Thus, the private and public sector external indebtedness as 
well as its refinancing is directly affected by the monetary policy of central banks in developed 
countries, which in turn results in different types of external vulnerabilities than the traditional 
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balance of payment concerns. 
 
It is also important to highlight that financial globalisation is a process specific to only a few 
countries in these developing regions, and their respective gross capital inflows and outflows. 
The current account position by regions not only fails to explain the cross-border capital flows, 
but it also overstates a trend (concentration of cross-border debt) that is typical of only a handful 
of countries. Scholars and policy-makers assessing the process of financial globalisation should 
focus on what is happening in these countries.  
Overall, although global gross capital flows have largely resulted from flows among 
advanced economies despite a decline in their share of world trade, emerging and developing 
countries have also been part of this global integration, becoming more vulnerable to both shifts 
in commodity prices and dependent on the international monetary cycles and monetary policy in 
developed countries. Therefore, an engagement with developing countries that focuses solely on 
trade and the provision of finance for development ends up neglecting a system of cross-border 
financial assets and liabilities resulting from countless domestic players engaging in purely 
financial transactions at any given point in time for a myriad of different reasons, which affects 
the vulnerability of those countries in a so far understudied way, and through that the 
vulnerability of the international financial system at large. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1: Long-Term External Debt Stock 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
 
 
Figure A2: Short-Term External Debt 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS) 
 
 
Figure A3: Total External Debt Service as Percentage of Exports of Goods, Services and 
Primary Income 
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Figure A4: Total External Debt Service as Percentage of Government Revenue 
 
 
 
Source: IMF WEO. Calculated as (total debt service % of the GDP)/(revenue % GDP) 
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Figure A5: Evolution of the Current Account and its Components in Nominal US Dollars 
Units 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6: Evolution of the Current Account and its Components as a Percentage of GDP 
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Figure A7: Trade Breakdown for all Emerging and Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Trade Breakdown for all Emerging and Developing Countries 
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Figure A9: Net Factor Income by Region 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10: Current Transfer by Region 
 
 
  
 
Figure A11: Commodity Prices 
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 Source: Bloomberg (2015) 
 
 
Figure A12: Implied Volatility – VIX 
 
 
      Source: Bloomberg (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
Commodity	prices
All	commodities Oil Copper Wheat
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Jan	2010
Jul	2010
Jan	2011
Jul	2011
Jan	2012
Jul	2012
Jan	2013
Jul	2013
Jan	2014
Jul	2014
Jan	2015
Jul	2015
Jan	2016
VIX	index
 
 
 35 
Figure A13: Emerging and Developing Economies’ Portfolio Liabilities, Debt and Foreign 
Reserves Shares to Their Respective Totals (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A14: Emerging Asia Gross Capital Flows (in billions of US dollars) 
 
 
Source: Borio & Disyatat, 2011, p. 11 
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Figure A15: Emerging and Developing Economies’ External Assets and Liabilities 
 
 
Source: updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
 
Figure A16: Emerging and Developing Economies’ External assets and Liabilities as 
Percentage of the GDP 
 
 
Source: updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 
